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Articles 
WHAT DOES THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
RESTRICT? A COLLECTIVE RIGHTS 
ANALYSIS 
Carl T. Bogus* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
According to the collective rights model, the Second 
Amendment only grants people the right to keep and bear arms 
within the militia. Moreover, the Amendment does not apply to 
private militias but only to the militia organized by Congress-
that is, to the National Guard. This seems to give the Amend-
ment very little bite. We are accustomed to thinking of the Bill 
of Rights as granting individuals broad, meaningful rights against 
governmental interference. The entire notion of a right is some-
thing one is entitled to even though the majority, through its 
elected representatives, decides otherwise. Thus, we have the 
right to speak and worship as we desire even if the government 
decides such speech or religious worship is harmful to the com-
munity; we have the right to a jury trial in certain circumstances 
even if the government decides that there are better ways to dis-
cover the truth. What kind of right is it, then, that gives indi-
viduals the right to keep and bear arms only within an entity or-
ganized and controlled by the government itself? After all, the 
government decides who is in the National Guard, and no one 
questions the National Guard's ability to regulate-fully and ab-
solutely- the possession and use of weapons by its members in 
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University. The author wishes to thank Mi-
chael C. Dorf, Saul Cornell, and participants in the Symposium on Guns, Crime and Pun-
ishment in America at the University of Arizona College of Law, where an earlier ver-
sion of this paper was presented, for their helpful comments. Copyright 2002 by Carl T. 
Bogus. All rights reserved. 
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their military capacities. Does the collective rights model there-
fore render the Second Amendment meaningless? 
This question has enormous significance in the debate be-
tween those who believe the Second Amendment grants a col-
lective right and those who believe it grants individuals a right to 
keep and bear weapons for their own purposes, outside and irre-
spective of militia membership. 1 Advocates of the individual 
rights model can justifiably argue that an interpretation of the 
Amendment that renders it meaningless should be disfavored.2 
Admittedly, it is theoretically possible that the Second Amend-
ment had meaning in 1791 but that over the past two hundred 
and ten years it has become an anachronism. It is also possible, 
as some have argued, that the right is presently dormant but may 
reawaken in the future.3 Nevertheless, it is an accepted canon of 
constitutional construction that when two possible interpreta-
tions of a provision are available, we should generally avoid the 
one that renders the provision meaningless or purposeless.4 
Therefore, the collective rights model is weakened if it drains the 
Second Amendment of any kind of practical utility or meaning. 
This criticism cuts with greatest force if the collective rights 
model renders the provision meaningless in 1791, of course. 
Still, the criticism retains at least some rhetorical power if the 
model renders the provision meaningless today, even if it has 
been primarily the passage of time that has drained the amend-
ment of practical significance. 
I do not believe that this is the case however. Although the 
Second Amendment grants only a collective right, it had genuine 
meaning with potential real-world consequences in 1791, and it 
still does today. However, I submit that the proper reading of 
the Amendment is not the one it is generally given. In this paper 
I shall explore the question of what vitality the collective rights 
interpretation of the Second Amendment has today-
specifically, what restrictions the Amendment places on gov-
ernment activity at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
I. See Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: 
A Primer, 76 Chi. Kent L. Rev.3 (2000). 
2. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) ("It cannot be 
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect"). 
3. See e.g., H. Richard Uviller and William G. Merkel, The Second Amendment in 
Context: The Case of the Vanishing Predicate, 76 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 403 (2000). 
4. See, e.g., Massachusetts Assn. of Health Main. Orgs. v. Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176, 
181 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[a]ll words and provisions of statutes are intended to have meaning 
and are to be given effect, and no construction should be adopted which would render 
statutory words or phrases meaningless, redundant or superfluous.") (citation omitted). 
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II. THE COLLECfiVE RIGHTS MODEL 
The Second Amendment reads: "A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. "5 All se-
rious readers of the Second Amendment recognize that the Sec-
ond Amendment is tied to the militia. Individual rights advo-
cates downplay that connection, often by use of two techniques. 
First, some suggest the prefatory phrase merely explains why the 
right is granted but does not define it-that is, that the Amend-
ment is to be given exactly the same meaning as if the first thir-
teen words did not exist. Second, some individual rights advo-
cates argue the Founders believed in a universal militia that in 
eighteenth century America included all adult, white males, and 
in contemporary America would include all adults. Both of 
these arguments drive to the same conclusion: every adult 
American has a right to ke~p and bear arms, regardless of 
whether one actually serves in the militia. 
Several problems arise in these arguments however. First 
and foremost, the Founders as a whole did not believe in a uni-
versal militia. Notwithstanding popular myth and Fourth of July 
rhetoric, the militia was a flop in the war against the British. 
General Nathaniel Greene explained why: 
People coming from home with all the tender feelings of do-
mestic life are not sufficiently fortified with natural courage to 
stand the shocking scenes of war. To march over dead men, 
to hear without concern the groans of the wounded, I say few 
men can stand such scenes unless steeled by habit and forti-
fied by military pride. 6 
So often did the militia turn and run in the face of the enemy 
that it became Continental Army doctrine to position militia 
forces in front of and between Continental Army regulars, who 
were given strict orders to shoot the first militiamen to bolt. 
After the Revolutionary War the Founders were divided on 
how the militia should be organized. While some continued to 
favor a universal militia, others-including Alexander Hamilton, 
for example-had become convinced that only a select, highly 
trained militia would be useful. At the Constitutional Conven-
tion in Philadelphia, the Founders decided the Constitution 
5. U.S. Const., Amend. II. 
6. See John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard 43 (MacMil-
lan, 1983). 
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should not permanently decide how the militia should be organ-
ized; rather, this was to be a policy question left up to Congress. 
Hence, Congress was given the authority to organize the militia 
as it saw fit, with the ability to change the composition of the mi-
litia as the passage of time and circumstances may demand.7 
Individual rights advocates face another problem when they 
attempt to read the Amendment in a way that essentially ignores 
the prefatory phrase. This too violates the canon of constitu-
tional construction that provisions should be read in a way that 
gives every phrase and every word operative meaning. We are 
to presume that the drafters inserted each and every word delib-
erately, intending that nothing be superfluous or without pur-
pose.8 This canon presents considerable difficulty for an inter-
pretation treating the first thirteen words of the Amendment as 
a mere annotation explaining why the Founders decided to write 
the next fourteen words. 
The argument that the word militia in the Second Amend-
ment should be read to mean a universal militia consisting of all 
adult citizens has even greater-indeed, fatal-problems. An-
other fundamental canon of construction provides that the Con-
stitution is to be read as a whole.9 Amendments are not to be 
treated as isolated provisions but as integral parts of the entire 
document. 10 Moreover, when a word is repeated it is presumed 
to have the same meaning in each place; thus, when in one in-
stance a word may be susceptible to different meanings, but in 
another has a definite meaning, we should presume the word 
was used in the same sense in both places. 11 When we combine 
this canon with the facts that (1) Madison was the principal 
drafter of both provisions and clearly knew how militia was de-
fined in the main body of the Constitution, (2) the Founders ex-
pressly stated that they had decided not to resolve the universal 
7. The belief in a universal militia did not last long however. Indeed, the belief in 
the militia as an effective military force-whether universal or select-also did not last 
long. In his first presidential address, Jefferson said that "a well-disciplined militia [is] 
our best reliance in peace, and for the first moments of war, till regulars relieve them." 
But the state militias were so ridiculous at annual musters-often drunk and disorderly, 
and abysmal shots-that states made it unlawful to mock them during musters. By his 
second term Jefferson had given up, declaring that the nation "would have to settle for a 
standing army." 
8. See, e.g., City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995); Succession of 
Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993), reh'g denied (Nov. 4, 1993); State ex reL Upchurch v. 
Blunt, 810 S.W.2d 515 (Mo. Bane 1991). 
9. E.g., Shamburger v. Duncan, 253 S.W.2d 388,391 (Ky. 1952). 
10. E.g., Kirkpatrick v. King, 91 N.E.2d 785,788 (Ind. 1950). 
II. E.g., House v. Cullman County, 593 So.2d 69, 72 (Ala. 1992). 
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militia versus select militia debate but to entrust this as a policy 
question for Congress, and (3) Madison stated that nothing in 
the Bill of Rights was in any fashion designed to alter the main 
body of the Constitution, the argument that militia means all 
adult citizens cannot reasonably be maintained. 
This brings me back to the collective rights model. Why 
provide, on the one hand, that Congress can organize the militia 
as it sees fit-deciding who serves in the militia, and regulating 
possession and use of weapons in militia service-and on the 
other hand state that the people have a right to keep and bear 
arms within the militia? A little background is necessary to an-
swer that question. 
As I have explained in detail elsewhere, 12 and will only 
briefly state here, I believe Madison wrote the Second Amend-
ment to assure the South that Congress-which had just been 
given the lion's share of authority over the state militia in the re-
cently-ratified Constitution-would not use that power to un-
dermine the slave system. In part, this was an amendment to the 
slave compromise in the Constitution. At the Constitutional 
Convention in Philadelphia, southern delegates made it clear the 
subject of slavery was not negotiable: either the North13 would 
agree not to attempt to abolish slavery or the southern states 
would walk away from Philadelphia and a Union with the North. 
The result was an obscurely stated constitutional compromise. 
While scrupulously avoiding the words "slave" and "slavery," 
the Constitution prohibited Congress from abolishing the Afri-
can slave trade until 1808 or imposing an import tax of more 
than ten dollars per slave. It also required that runaway slaves 
escaping across state lines (and into free territory) be returned to 
their owners. And it provided for counting slaves as three-fifths 
of free persons for the purposes of apportioning congressional 
representation and direct taxation. 
The southern delegates told their constituents that, most 
importantly of all, the Constitution did not grant Congress any 
authority to abolish slavery, and that the northern delegates con-
ceded this was the case. But not everyone was satisfied. During 
the ratification debates, southern anti-Federalists argued that by 
12. Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 309 (1998). 
13. New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and the New England states were then re-
ferred to as the Eastern states. To avoid confusion, I refer to them as the North or the 
northern states. 
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giving Congress the power to organize and arm the militia14 and 
to call them into federal service,15 the Constitution gave Con-
gress the means to undermine the slave system indirectly. Con-
gress might either disarm the militia or physically remove them 
from a state, thus leaving the white population vulnerable to 
slave revolt. It was a frightening prospect. 
I believe that when Virginia sent Madison to the first Con-
gress, Madison sought to correct part of this problem by writing 
the Second Amendment. Madison's objective was to strengthen 
the slave compromise by adding another provision to the militia 
clauses of the Constitution. Madison wanted to make it clear 
that although Congress had the authority to arm the militia, it 
could not disarm the militia, at least not entirely. Put somewhat 
more succinctly, the states were to have a right to armed militias. 
This makes sense once one understands that the principal, and 
from Madison and the South's point of view, critical function of 
the militia was slave control. That had been true before and dur-
ing the Revolution, and it remained true afterwards. In 1734, for 
example, South Carolina officially declared that slave patrols 
took precedence over other militia functions. 16 In 1756, Charles 
Pinckney, chief justice of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, 
reported that the colony's militia was unreliable for any function 
other than slave control. 17 During the Revolutionary War, the 
South often refused to commit her militia to the war against the 
British, fearing the absence of the militia left it exposed to slave 
revolt. 18 
If the states were to have the means to provide for their own 
security, they needed an armed militia. This did not mean the 
states had a right to a fully armed populace; indeed, the idea of 
everyone having arms was anathema at the time. Nor did it 
mean the states rather than the federal government were to have 
14. The Constitution gives Congress the power: 
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for govern-
ing such Part of them as may be employed in Service of the United States, re-
serving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Au-
thority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. 
U.S. Canst., Art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
15. The Constitution gives Congress the power: 
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, sup-
press Insurrections, and repel Invasions. 
U.S. Canst., Art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
16. See Michael A. Bellesiles, Arming America 151 (Alfred A. Knopf, 2000). 
17. Id. See also M.E. Bradford, Founding Fathers 194 (U. Press of Kansas, 2d ed. 
1994) (noting that Pinckney was chief justice of South Carolina). 
18. See Michael A. Bellesfles, The Origins of Gun Culture in the United States 1760-
1865 at 83 J. Am. Hist. 425,429 (1996). 
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the right to regulate arms within the militia. Congress continued 
to have the authority to discipline, that is, regulate, the militia, 
with the new qualification that it could not wholly deprive a state 
of an armed militia and thus the means of providing for its own 
security. 
One might ask why-if the Second Amendment essentially 
means that the states have a right to an armed militia-the 
Amendment does not say that directly rather than referring to a 
"right of the people to keep and bear Arms." The answer has to 
do with how the militias were armed in colonial America. To-
day, of course, weapons in the hands of the National Guard are 
furnished by the government; but that was not the case in colo-
nial America. Guns were extremely expensive, and the colonies 
could not afford them in great numbers. The attempted solution 
was to require militia members to furnish their own arms or to 
require others to do so on their behalf. For example, when Con-
necticut enacted its first militia act in 1637, it made the towns re-
sponsible for supplying firearms and munitions to militia mem-
bers.19 But the firearms were too expensive and the towns 
largely ignored the law, preferring the occasional small fines that 
the Connecticut General Court imposed for non-compliance?0 
When Congress enacted the first militia act in 1792 it required 
militia members to arm themselves?1 
State laws also made it clear that all firearms were essen-
tially governmental property whether purchased privately or 
supplied by a public body. The government could regulate 
whether guns were to be kept at home or in an armory, whether 
they could-or must-be carried when on public business, and 
under what circumstances they could be used. State legislatures 
enacted statutes giving government officials the right to expro-
priate and redistribute all firearms and ammunition, including 
arms individuals had purchased themselves, as necessary to deal 
with crises.22 As Michael A. Bellesiles writes: "[T]he govern-
ment reserved to itself the right to impress arms on any occasion, 
either as a defensive measure against possible insurrection or for 
use by the state. No gun ever belonged unqualifiedly to an indi-
vidual. "23 Therefore, though today a right of the people to keep 
and bear arms within a government regulated militia seems like 
19. See Belleslles, Arming America at 77 (cited in note 16). 
20. ld. 
21. See Perpich v. Dep't. of Def, 496 U.S. 334,350 (1990). 
22. See Bellesiles, Arming America at 70-80 (cited in note 16). 
23. Id. at 79. 
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an oxymoron, such a right made sense when the militia was 
armed by weapons in the hands of the people. 
I submit, therefore, that even though the Amendment pro-
tects a right of the people, in contemporary terminology it pro-
vides the states with a right to an armed militia. The Amend-
ment is properly seen as qualifying, though not essentially 
altering, the militia provisions in the Constitution. Congress has 
the authority to organize the militia but not to organize it out of 
existence, the right to arm the militia but not the right to disarm 
it entirely, the right to call the militia into federal service but not 
to do so in ways that unduly jeopardize a state's security. I say 
"unduly jeopardize" because national security may both tran-
scend and subsume state security. Calling forth the militias to 
repel an invasion on, say, the southern border might be justified 
even though it left the New England states defenseless against 
local insurrection, because the invasion would ultimately 
threaten the security of the all the states. 
Needless to say, this is not how the Second Amendment is 
generally analyzed. Over the last half of the twentieth century, 
at least, we have become accustomed to thinking about whether 
the Amendment prohibits gun control legislation affecting the 
general population. But, I submit, a correct interpretation of the 
Amendment focuses instead on the militia. The correct question 
is whether the Second Amendment restricts federal control of 
the militia, and if so, how. Such restrictions may be modest but 
nonetheless significant. This is not a new view. One history of 
the National Guard, for example, states simply that the Second 
Amendment "was intended to prevent the federal government 
from disarming the militia. "24 But it is becoming something of a 
forgotten view. 
Ill. FOUR CASE HISTORIES 
What then are some of the circumstances that would raise 
genuine Second Amendment issues? This section presents four 
historical episodes for consideration, which I offer as real world 
examples of the kind of federal action to which the Second 
Amendment is germane. In the following section (section IV), I 
will offer some observations about whether, when faced with 
24. U.S. Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, Pub. No. A-124, The 
National Guard: Defending the Nation and the States 8 (1993) (footnote omitted) ("De-
fending the Nation"). 
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cases arising out of these incidents, the courts should have found 
that the federal action did violate the Second Amendment. 
A. PROHIBITING MILITIA IN THE FORMER CONFEDERATE 
STATES (1867) 
After the Civil War, former Confederate Army regiments in 
the southern states began to reconstitute themselves as state mi-
litia units. They often wore Confederate Army uniforms, carried 
the Confederate battle flag, and intimidated emancipated slaves. 
This alarmed Republicans in Congress, and on February 26, 
1867, Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts introduced an 
amendment to the army appropriations bill then pending in 
Congress. Wilson's amendment read in its entirety: 
And be it further enacted, That all militia forces now organized 
or in service in either of the States of Virginia, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, 
Mississippi and Texas, further organization, arming, or calling 
into service of the said militia forces, or any part of thereof, is 
hereby prohibited under any circumstances whatever until the 
same shall be authorized by Congress.25 
A debate ensued, focused in part on whether depriving the 
states of their militias would violate the Second Amendment. 
Senator Virginia Senator Waitman T. Willey of West Virginia 
said: 
It seems to me that this is a very sweeping provision, and 
which can only be justified I imagine by some very pressing 
public urgency or necessity, to deprive these States of the use 
of their militia for the purpose of maintaining their police 
regulations in many places. The disability, as I understand the 
amendment, is total; the whole of the militia organizations of 
these States is to be entirely destroyed; the militia of the 
States are not to bear arms in any event or under any condi-
tion. It strikes me that it is assuming to Congress a very ex-
traordinary power, one which none but the most extreme ne-
cessity would justify. It may be well imagined that there may 
be instances when it would be necessary, for the best of pur-
poses, to keep the peace of the State, to maintain proper po-
lice regulations, that the militia should at least carry arms to a 
limited extent. It strikes me also that there may be some con-
stitutional objection against depriving men of the right to bear 
25. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1848 (1867). 
494 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:485 
arms and the total disarming of men in time of peace?6 
Senator Wilson defended his proposal by arguing that it 
would prohibit the formation of militia units but not the en-
forcement of police regulations by other authorized officials. 
More important for our purposes, Wilson also argued the ban on 
militia was to be only temporary. Once "matters are settled," he 
said, "these States will be at liberty to organize their militia as 
the other States do."27 After Senator Thomas A. Hendricks of 
Indiana (who would later be Vice President under President 
Grover Cleveland) also contended that the provision violated 
the Second Amendment, Wilson offered a compromise: He was 
willing to strike out the word "disarmed."28 Willey graciously re-
jected the offer, however. Although he said he found the 
amendment less offensive with the word deleted, Willey stated 
he would vote against the measure nonetheless because it still 
prevented "the arming and employment" of militia forces. 
The amendment passed 23 to 11. President Andrew John-
son wanted to veto the measure but could not do so without ve-
toing the entire army appropriations act and de~riving the Army 
of funds and Union soldiers of their salaries. 9 He therefore 
signed it under protest, sending Congress a message protesting 
the portion of the Act that, in his words, "denies to ten States of 
the Union their constitutional right to protect themselves, in any 
emergency, by means of their own militia. "30 
B. FEDERALIZING THE ARKANSAS NATIONAL GUARD (1957) 
Two years before the Supreme Court handed down its opin-
ion in Brown v. Board of Education, the city of Little Rock, Ar-
kansas had already designed a seven-year school integration 
26. Id. Some may seize upon Willey's phrase "depriving men of the right to bear 
arms" rather than depriving the state of an armed militia as evidence that Willey envi-
sioned the Constitution as protecting an individual right to bear arms rather than the col-
lective right of the states to have armed militias (emphasis added). In my judgment, 
however, it would be a mistake to attach too much significance to Willey's imprecise use 
of language. After all, the amendment did not disarm individuals; it prohibited militias 
forces. 
27. Id. at 1849. 
28. Id. "Of course," he added, "in time of war people bearing arms in hostility to 
the Government would not be protected by this provision of the Constitution." 
29. See Mahon, History of the Milita and National Guard at 108 (cited in note 6); 
Albert Castel, The Presidency of Andrew Johnson 113 (The Regents Press of Kansas, 
1979). 
30. Message from the President of the United States to House of Representatives 
Transmitting Notice of Signing the Army Appropriations Bill, 40th Cong., 1st Sess., 
March 2, 1867. 
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plan.31 The plan had been devised under the leadership of the 
city's mayor, Woodrow Mann, and was approved by the school 
board. Litigation was filed challenging the plan as proceeding 
too slowly but the federal court disagreed, approving the school 
board's plan but retaining jurisdiction to ensure the plan in fact 
moved with all deliberate speed. The plan was to begin in 1957 
with the admission of 25 black students to the city's 2,000-
student Central High School. 
Everything was expected to proceed smoothly until Marvin 
Griffin, the governor of Georgia, came to town and gave a fiery 
speech attacking school integration. Griffin's speech found an 
enthusiastic response in certain quarters, stimulating Arkansas 
Governor Orval Faubus to seize on the issue as a means of im-
proving his political fortunes. Faubus, a colorless individual with 
declining popularity, was in the middle of his second two-year 
term. He faced a daunting task in trying to win re-election be-
cause Arkansas had a strong tradition against governors serving 
for more than two terms. 
Faubus' opening gambit was to call Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral William Rogers to ask what the federal government could 
do to prevent violence when the integration plan went into effect 
in September. Rogers told Faubus that local disorders were 
generally the province of the local police, but he dispatched the 
head of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, 
who happened to be an Arkansas native, to Little Rock to find 
out what was going on. When this official asked Faubus why he 
expected violence, Faubus said his intelligence was "too vague 
and indefinite to be of any use to a law enforcement agency,"32 
and Faubus was otherwise sufficiently strange and elusive to lead 
federal officials to suspect that Faubus, himself, was going to try 
to stir up trouble. 
In August, a white woman filed a state court action seeking 
to enjoin the integration plan because, she claimed, it would lead 
31. For the description of the Little Rock episode, I draw heavily on two works: 
Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts 228-43 (Basic Books,1994), and William Man-
chester, The Glory and the Dream· A Narrative History of America 1932-1972 at 978-90 
(Little, Brown & Company, 1973). I also consulted Taylor Branch, Paning the Waters: 
America in the King Years 1954-1963 at 222-25 (Simon and Schuster, 1988); Mahon, His-
tory of the Milita and National Guard at 224-25 (cited in note 6); Geoffrey Perret, Eisen-
hower 550-54 (Random House, 1999); Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower 150-55 (U. Press of Kansas, 1991). Where sources have differed, as they 
have in a number of details, I relied on Jack Greenberg's account generally and John K. 
Mahon's account of military matters. 
32. See Manchester, The Glory and the Dream at 800 (cited in note 31). 
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to violence. Faubus is assumed to have been the moving force 
behind the lawsuit; he personally testified in the proceeding, 
stating that revolvers had been found in the possession of both 
black and white students. The state court granted the injunction. 
However, at the request of the Little Rock school board the fed-
eral district court promptly dissolved that injunction and prohib-
ited the state court from interfering in the desegregation of the 
schools. 
There were, in fact, no genuine omens of violence. Never-
theless, Mayor Mann and the city police force worked out con-
tingency plans to control demonstrations, should that be neces-
sary. They did not expect trouble, however, and were confident 
the 175-member city police force could handle it should it occur. 
On the evening before the school term was to begin, Faubus 
appeared on Little Rock television to announce that the city was 
plunging into violence. Local stores were selling out their supply 
of knives, "Mostly to Negro youths," he said. "[T]he evidence of 
discord, anger, and resentment has come to me from so many 
sources as to become a deluge," so he had called out the Arkan-
sas National Guard "to maintain or restore the peace and good 
order of this community."33 He had directed the Guard to pre-
vent black students from entering the school because, he said, if 
they did, "Blood will run in the streets."34 An hour before Fau-
bus spoke, National Guard troops, bearing M-1 rifles with fixed 
bayonets, had already surrounded Central High School. 
Faubus' claims of impending violence were bunk. The FBI 
checked one hundred stores and found that knife sales were be-
low normal levels. Mayor Mann said there had been no indica-
tion whatsoever of possible violence. And three other Arkansas 
towns peacefully integrated on that same day. 
The school board asked the black students not to attempt to 
enroll the next morning and returned to federal district court for 
instructions. The judge ordered the board to proceed with its 
plan. On September 4, parents of only nine of the 25 black stu-
dents who were scheduled to be enrolled permitted their chil-
dren to attempt to go to school. Faubus had finally generated 
his mob. As they approached the school, the black students 
were jostled by angry segregationists screaming racial epithets. 
Nevertheless, accompanied by white and black ministers, the 
students made their way to the National Guard perimeter, where 
33. Id. at 801. 
34. Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts at 229 (cited in note 31). 
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they were confronted by a solid wall of Guardsmen and told, 
"Governor Faubus has placed this school off limits to Ne-
groes."35 
The federal district judge made Faubus a defendant in the 
case and ordered him to appear in court on September 20th to 
show cause why he should not be enjoined from obstructing the 
enrollment of black students at the high school. Federal mar-
shals proceeded to the governor's mansion, where they passed 
easily through a perimeter of National Guardsmen to hand the 
Governor a subpoena to appear in court. 
At this juncture, Faubus sought presidential help. In re-
sponse to a question at a press conference two months earlier, 
President Eisenhower had said, "I can't imagine any set of cir-
cumstances that would ever induce me to send federal troops ... 
into any area to enforce the orders of a federal court, because I 
believe that [the] common sense of America will never require 
it. "36 Perhaps this led Faubus to believe the President would 
commit to not using troops to enforce federal court orders. Fau-
bus flew to Rhode Island for a personal meeting with President 
Eisenhower at the summer White House in Newport. He did 
not get want he wanted. Eisenhower reiterated what he told 
Faubus by telegram several days earlier, namely, that "[t]he only 
assurance I can give you is that the federal constitution will be 
upheld by me by every legal means at my command. "37 
On September 20th, the federal court enjoined Faubus and 
the Arkansas National Guard from obstructing black students 
from attending the high school. The order explicitly stated that 
the governor retained his authority to use the National Guard to 
maintain peace and order. Peace and order were not what Fau-
bus had in mind, however, and he withdrew the Guard entirely. 
When the Little Rock police arrived at Central High School 
at 6:00 A.M. on September 23rd to secure the area for the en-
rollment of black students that morning, they found themselves 
confronting an ugly mob. The police cleared vital areas with 
swinging nightsticks and erected sawhorse barricades. At 8:45 
A.M. someone in the crowd screamed, "Here come the nig-
gers,"38 and the crowd overran the police to chase and beat four 
blacks who, as it happened, were not students but reporters. 
35. Manchester, The Glory and the Dream at 801 (cited in note 31). 
36. Perret, Eisenhower at 508 (cited in note 31 ). 
37. Manchester, The Glory and the Dream at 981 (cited in note 31). 
38. Id. at 803. 
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During this spectacle, the nine black students slipped unno-
ticed into the school. Once inside, they had a relatively easy 
time of it. No white students displayed hostility; some made 
friendly advances. Meanwhile, matters outside continued to de-
teriorate. Attracted by news broadcasts, the mob swelled to 
nearly a thousand. In late morning, the crowd surged forward, 
overrunning the police and demolishing their barricades. As the 
mob reached the doors of the school, a now very worried Mayor 
Mann removed the black students from the school. The next 
morning he sent President Eisenhower a telegram in Newport. 
It began: "Immediate need for federal troops is urgent,"39 The 
mob was even larger than yesterday, armed, and violent. "Situa-
tion is out of control and police cannot disperse the mob," it con-
tinued. "I am pleading to you as President of the United 
States ... to provide the necessary federal troops" to restore 
peace and order. 
Eisenhower was already aware of the situation. The day be-
fore his staff had prepared a presidential proclamation titled 
"Obstruction of Justice in the State of Arkansas" and providing 
for the use of federal troops, but the President had not yet 
signed it. He did so now. That night he went on national televi-
sion to explain his action to the American people. "The very ba-
sis of our individual rights and freedoms rests upon the certainty 
that the President and the executive branch of government will 
support and insure the carrying out of the decisions of the fed-
eral courts, even, when necessary, with all the means at the 
President's command," he said.40 
The next day President Eisenhower signed a second proc-
lamation authorizing the Secretary of Defense to call the entire 
10,000-member Arkansas National Guard into active federal 
service. Eisenhower was careful not to transmit this order 
through the normal channel, that is, the Governor of the state. 
The President placed Major General Edwin A. Walker in com-
mand and ordered him to ensure that the order was communi-
cated directly to the Guardsmen. 
Eisenhower did not nationalize the Arkansas National 
Guard in order to use them, at least not as his principal means of 
restoring order. The main objective was to deprive Faubus of 
the Guard. The main federal force was a thousand paratroopers 
39. Parret, Eisenhower at 552 (cited in note 31). For stylistic purposes, I have ren-
dered the telegram in capital and small letters, although, as telegrams are, the original 
was entirely capitalized. 
40. Manchester, The Glory and the Dream at 805 (cited in note 31). 
2001] COLLECTIVE RIGHTS ANALYSIS 499 
from the elite 101st Airborne Division, who were flown in trans-
port planes from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Arkansas. Never-
theless, as John C. Mahon writes, federalizing the Arkansas N a-
tiona! Guard "created a situation without precedent: it directed 
the Guardsmen to disregard their state commander-in-chief and 
obey the commands of the president at a time when they were 
on active state duty."41 
Southern politicians fiercely denounced Eisenhower's ac-
tions. Senator Richard Russell of Georgia said Eisenhower was 
employing the tactics of Hitler's storm troopers. Senator Olin 
Johnson of South Carolina urged Faubus to challenge Eisen-
hower's authority over the Guard. "If I were Governor Faubus, 
I'd proclaim an insurrection down there, and I'd call out the Na-
tional Guard, and I'd then find out who's going to run things in 
my state," he said.42 Faubus did not do so, however. He re-
ferred to the military units as "occupation forces,"43 and claimed 
they were guilty of all manner of outrages, including bludgeon-
ing innocent bystanders and poking bayonets into the backs of 
schoolgirls with "the warm, red blood of patriotic Americans 
staining the cold, naked, unsheathed knives. "44 The accusations 
were, of course, hokum. There were confrontations between 
troops and the mob, during which one man who tried to seize a 
paratrooper's rifle was hit with a steel butt of an M-1. The stu-
dents were enrolled and protected. 
After the initial period, General Walker discharged all of 
the Arkansas National Guard (who, for the most part, had been 
required to spend the days in their armories), except for a special 
task force of 1,800 Guardsmen. In November, finances required 
returning the 101st Airborne detachment to Fort Campbell, and 
the Guardsmen became the main presence on the scene. The 
black students continued to be protected by a small contingent 
of Guardsmen for the balance of the school year. 
C. FEDERALIZING THE ALABAMA NATIONAL GUARD (1963). 
A similar episode occurred on June 11, 1963, when Gover-
nor George C. Wallace of Alabama made his famous stand in 
the schoolhouse door to prevent two black students, Vivian 
41. Mahon, History of the Milita and National Guard at 225 (cited in note 6). 
42. Manchester, The Glory and the Dream at 808 (cited in note 31). 
43. Branch, Parting the Waters at 224 (cited in note 31). 
44. Manchester, The Glory and the Dream at 807 (cited in note 31). 
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Malone and James Hood, from enrolling at the University of 
Alabama.45 
The Kennedy Administration had been embarrassed when 
it relied on Governor Ross Barnett and state officials to protect 
James Meredith, who had registered as the first black student at 
the University of Mississippi in the fall of the preceding year. 
Federal marshals on the scene had been attacked by an armed 
mob. In the five hours before being rescued by federal troops, 
the marshals sustained more than two dozen gunshot wounds 
and many cuts and contusions. A bystander and a newsman 
were killed. It is understandable, therefore, that the Administra-
tion was jittery despite Governor Wallace's statement nine days 
earlier on Meet the Press that, although "I shall stand at the door 
as I stated in my campaign for Governor," the "confrontation 
will be handled peacefully and without violence. "46 
Even though Robert Kennedy made a special trip to Bir-
mingham to ask him, Wallace would not tell Kennedy Admini-
stration officials exactly what he was planning. One source told 
them that the "thing is greased" and that Wallace would "make 
a gesture then step aside."47 Another source reported Wallace 
intended to stand in the door with members of the Alabama 
Highway Patrol, who would be instructed to bar Malone and 
Hood even if escorted by federal marshals. The Administration 
decided to have troops ready if needed, and put General Creigh-
ton Abrams in charge of military planning. 
Deputy Attorney General Nicolas Katzenbach, who had 
principal responsibility for the operation as a whole, told 
Abrams he had no opinion about whether to use regular Army 
or National Guard but that "it would probably be necessary to 
federalize the Guard to take it away from Wallace's control."48 
Ultimately, Attorney General Robert Kennedy decided to use 
the National Guard rather than regular army to avoid com-
plaints about Yankee occupying forces. 
45. For the description of the Tuscaloosa episode, I draw heavily on Dan T. Carter, 
The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, The Origins of the New Conservatism, and the 
Transformation of American Politics 133-55 (Simon & Schuster, 1995), and Stephan 
Lesher, George Wallace: American Populist 201-36 (Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1994). I 
also consulted E. Culpepper Oark, The Schoolhouse Door: Segregation's Last Stand at 
the University of Alabama (Oxford U. Press, 1993); Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts at 
334-40 (cited in note 31); Mahon, History of the Milita and National Guard at 237-38 
(cited in note 6); Manchester, The Glory and the Dream at 979-81 (cited in note 31). 
46. Carter, The Politics of Rage at 137 (cited in note 45). 
47. Clark, The Schoolhouse Door at 208 (cited in note 45). 
48. Id. 
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On the day of the confrontation, Wallace assembled a force 
of seven hundred state troopers and National Guardsmen. As it 
turned out, they were there for cosmetics. George Wallace was 
a lot more savvy than Orval Faubus. Wallace knew exactly what 
he wanted. It was not violence. It was good television. 
The Kennedy Administration's strategy was to render the 
doorway stand meaningless. The University had preregistered 
the two students and assigned them to dormitories, so there was 
no practical need for them to enter Foster Auditorium. Never-
theless, the Administration decided to allow Wallace to have his 
show. Wallace painted a white line on the ground outside Foster 
Auditorium, where students entered to register, and ensconced 
himself in an office just inside the entrance. 
Deputy Attorney General Nicolas Katzenbach told the 
press that the students would arrive at 10:00 A.M. When a look-
out signaled that Katzenbach and the students had arrived, Wal-
lace appeared on the front steps with a contingent of armed state 
policemen in combat gear. A Wallace aide placed a classroom 
lectern and microphone in front of the double doors at the main 
entrance to Foster Auditorium, and Wallace took up position 
behind the lectern. While Malone and Hood remained in the 
cars, Katzenbach, flanked by the United States Attorney and 
U.S. marshals, strode up to the lectern. Wallace raised his right 
hand, as would a traffic cop ordering cars to stop. "I have a 
proclamation from the President of the United States ordering 
you to cease and desist from unlawful obstructions," stated 
Katzenbach.49 "I have come to ask you for unequivocal assur-
ance that vou or anyone under your control will not bar these 
students. ,5'o 
Wallace did not respond. After an awkward silence, 
Katzenbach tried to resume his statement, only to have Wallace 
cut him off. "Now you make your statement, but we don't need 
a speech."51 After a few more sentences from Katzenbach, Wal-
lace launched into a seven-minute speech denouncing the "un-
warranted and force-induced intrusion upon the campus of the 
University of Alabama of the might of the central government," 
with the climactic conclusion forbidding "this illegal and unwar-
ranted action by the Central Government. "52 
49. Manchester, The Glory and the Dream at 980 (cited in note 31). 
50. Carter, The Politics of Rage at 148 (cited in note 45). 
51. ld. at 149. 
52. Id. 
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"I'm not interested in this show," Katzenbach replied, trying 
to comply with the Attorney General's instructions to make 
Wallace look foolish. "These students will remain on this cam-
pus," he continued. "They will register today. They will go to 
school tomorrow."53 The two men stood silently looking at one 
another for a few moments; Katzenbach then turned and de-
parted. This, as it turns out, was the scene that Wallace wanted. 
The visual television image was of the Governor of Alabama 
standing nose to nose with an representative of the federal gov-
ernment, with the Governor standing his ground and the federal 
official retreating. Not everyone saw it this way, of course, but 
many of Wallace's constituents did. Federal officials took 
Malone and Hood to their dormitories. Later in the day, when 
Malone sat alone in the University cafeteria about a half dozen 
women students brought their food trays to her table, and smil-
ing, sat down and introduced themselves. 
When Katzenbach returned to his office, he recommended 
nationalizing the Alabama National Guard, and the President 
signed an executive order doing so shortly thereafter. The 
Guard was placed under the immediate command of National 
Guard General Henry V. Graham, who was in the real estate 
business in Birmingham. Early in the afternoon, Graham met 
with a Wallace aide, who assured him that if Wallace were al-
lowed to read a second statement he would step aside without 
trouble. Graham passed this offer to General Creighton 
Abrams, who in turn passed it on to the Attorney General, who 
approved the deal. 
Just before 3:00P.M. Graham arrived at the University with 
a hundred now-federalized Guardsmen. Flanked by four armed 
soldiers-and dressed in combat fatigues with the Confederate 
battle flag of the 31st (Dixie) Division sewn over his pocket-
Graham strode up to Wallace's lectern, behind which the gover-
nor had repositioned himself. Graham saluted Wallace and said, 
"Sir, it is my sad duty to ask you to step aside under orders from 
the president of the United States."54 Wallace returned the sa-
lute and said he wanted to make a statement. "Certainly, sir," 
responded Graham, who then stepped aside. "But for the un-
warranted federalization of the National Guard, I would be your 
commander-in-chief," said Wallace. "It is a bitter pill to swal-
53. Id. 
54. See Lesher, George Wallace: American Populist at 233 (cited in note 45). 
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low."55 After a few additional remarks, Wallace honored his 
word and walked away. 
That night, President John F. Kennedy addressed the nation 
on television. "Good evening, my fellow citizens," he began. 
"This afternoon, following a series of threats and defiant state-
ments, the presence of Alabama National Guardsmen was re-
quired on the University of Alabama [campus] to carry out the 
final and unequivocal order of the United States District 
Court."56 
D. THE MONTGOMERY AMENDMENT(1987) 
In 1985, the federal government ordered more than 12,000 
National Guardsmen for active duty training in Central Amer-
ica, principally Honduras. President Reagan wanted to use these 
exercises to intimidate the Sandinista government in Nicaragua 
with a show of force and to assist in developing a staging area for 
a Contra-rebel invasion of Nicaragua.57 At that time, federal 
statutes permitted the Secretary of Defense to order members of 
the National Guard to active duty outside the United States only 
with the consent of the state's governor. A survey by the Con-
gressional Research Service revealed that less than half the gov-
ernors would approve training exercises in Honduras. When the 
Reagan Administration proceeded with the program nonethe-
less, the governors of more than a dozen states (and the Iowa 
legislature) balked, and the governors of California and Maine 
successfully refused directives to send units there. 58 
In response to what it viewed as a problem of allowing gov-
ernors to veto National Guard training exercises outside the 
United States, Congress enacted legislation known as the Mont-
gomery Amendment. That statute authorizes the Secretary of 
Defense to order National Guard members to active federal 
duty for training for up to fifteen days a year notwithstanding a 
gubernatorial objection on the .prounds of "location, purpose, 
type, or schedule" of the duty.5 The Governor of Minnesota 
challenged the constitutionality of this legislation.60 He argued 
55. See Carter, The Politics of Rage at 150 (cited in note 45). 
56. Id. at 152. 
57. See Defending the Nation at 24 (cited in note 24). 
58. Id. 
59. 10 U.S. C. § 12301(f) (1994). Members of the reserve components, including the 
Natwnal Guard, may be ordered to active duty without gubernatorial consent in times or 
war or national emergency declared by Congress or a national emergency declared by 
the President.lO U.S.C. §§ 12301(a) (1994), 12302(a) (1994). 
60. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 337. 
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that the Constitution only authorizes the federal government to 
call forth the militia for three specific purposes, namely, to exe-
cute the laws of the United States, suppress insurrections, and 
repel invasions. Thus, he maintained, the federal government 
could not nationalize the state militia for any other purpose, in-
cluding training, without gubernatorial consent. 
The Supreme Court declared the Act to be constitutional.61 
The Court's decision was grounded in the dual enlistment pro-
gram established by Congress. Under this program, all members 
of the National Guard simultaneously enroll in both their state's 
National Guard and the National Guard of the United States 
(NGUS). Under the structure established by Congress, NGUS is 
part of the reserve component of the United States Armed 
Forces.62 Federal law expressly provides that when members of 
the National Guard are ordered to active duty, they serve in 
their capacity as reserves of the United States Army or Air 
Force, as the case may be.63 The Supreme Court held, therefore, 
that because all of the members of the Minnesota National 
Guard had voluntarily enrolled in NGUS, they could be ordered 
to Honduras in that capacity. During periods of active duty ser-
vice, NGUS members would be "temporarily disassociated" 
from the state militia.64 
The Supreme Court found this plan constitutionally sound 
because, it said, the militia clauses of the Constitution gave Con-
gress additional military powers without in any fashion limiting 
its authority to maintain an Army and a Navy. Congress can 
draft citizens into the armed forces without regard to whether 
they serve in a state militia. Thus, Congress can require dual en-
rollment and order militia members into active duty in their ca-
pacities as members of the federal armed forces notwithstanding 
their militia membership. 
The Governor of Minnesota argued that this interpretation 
of the militia clauses nullified the state's authority over its mili-
tia. The Court rejected this argument, stating that its interpreta-
tion "merely recognizes the supremacy of federal power in the 
area of military affairs."65 Most significantly for our purposes, 
the Court noted that because the Montgomery Amendment only 
prohibited the governors from objecting to active duty assign-
61. Id. 
62. 10 u.s.c. § 10101. 
63. 10 u.s.c. § 12403. 
64. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 347. 
65. Id. at 351. 
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ments on the grounds of "location, purpose, type, or schedule," 
the Governor of Missouri could object to sending his state's Na-
tional Guard to Honduras if that interfered with the state's abil-
ity to respond to local emergencies. 
IV. ANALYZING THE CASE HISTORIES 
Did the federal government violate the Second Amendment 
in any of these four incidents? An examination of that question 
begins with the observation that the Constitution appears to 
guarantee states the right to a militia. While it does not do so 
expressly, four constitutional provisions66 refer to the militia and 
thus presuppose their existence, and one of the provisions gives 
the states certain powers over the militia, including the right to 
appoint officers of the militia.67 These four sections are properly 
read together. One of the things that the Second Amendment 
adds is that the states not only have a right to militias but to 
armed militias. 
From its text and history, I believe we know the Second 
Amendment guarantees the states the right to armed militias so 
that they can provide for their own security. When the Second 
Amendment was written, the South was not confident that Con-
gress would react forcefully to quell slave insurrections in south-
ern states. Indeed, the South was afraid Congress might actively 
encourage slave revolts by disarming or otherwise compromising 
the state militia. By writing the Second Amendment, Madison 
sought to prohibit Congress from disarming the state militia. If 
Congress tried to disarm the militia indirectly by simply not fur-
nishing arms to the militia, the Second Amendment essentially 
permits the state governments, or the people themselves, to sup-
ply the arms.68 
66. I refer to the provisions: (1) giving Congress the authority to call forth the mili· 
tia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions (Art. I, § 
8, cl. 15); (2) giving Congress the power to organize, arm, and discipline the militia, and 
govern them while in service of the United States, and-most significantly for these pur-
poses-expressly reserving to the states the power to appoint officers and train the mili-
tia in accordance with the discipline established by Congress (Art. I, § 8, cl. 16); (3) mak-
ing the President the Commander in Chief "of the militia of the several states" when 
called into federal service (Art. II,§ 2, cl. 1); and (4) the Second Amendment. 
67. Professor Tribe has noted that the Constitution presupposes "the existence of 
the states as entities independent of the national government" because it refers to the 
states and "expressly place[s]lirnits on the power of Congress in the interest of state sov-
ereignty." Tribe specifically mentions the militia clauses in this connection. Laurence H. 
Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law § 5-12 at 907 (Foundation Press, 3rd ed. 2000). 
Similarly, the militia clauses presuppose state militias, or at least a state right to a militia. 
68. Don Higginbotham, an authority on the eighteenth century militia, agrees. He 
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I do not argue, however, that this right is absolute. No right 
is absolute, whether belonging to an individual or a state. More-
over, the Constitution provides a sophisticated structure in 
which the rights and obligations concerning the militia are di-
vided between the federal and state governments. As previously 
suggested, a state may have no right whatsoever to a militia if 
Congress calls the entire militia into federal service to repel an 
invasion, at least until danger has passed. It is less clear, how-
ever, whether the federal government can deprive a state of its 
militia in less dire circumstances, or if so, under what circum-
stances or for how long. 
Of the four incidents in Part III, the federal action that most 
directly infringed on the states' right to an armed militia was the 
first one, that is, depriving the southern states of their militia 
during Reconstruction. The very purpose of the federal action 
was to abridge the states' constitutionally guaranteed right to a 
militia, especially an armed militia. But that does not necessary 
mean the courts should have declared this to be unconstitutional. 
Paradoxically, the federal government violated the letter of 
the Second Amendment in order to effectuate its spirit. Ten 
states had gone to war against the Union. That bloody war, with 
its terrible passions, had ended less than two years earlier. The 
terms of surrender at Appomattox Court House allowed Con-
federate officers to keep their guns.69 Two days after Appomat-
tox, President Lincoln gave a speech in which he told the nation 
that though the war's end was cause for joy, the task of recon-
struction was "fraught with great difficulty."70 "No one man has 
authorit7 to give up the rebellion for any other man," he ob-
served.7 Three days later Lincoln was assassinated. 
Andrew Johnson and Congress, to grossly understate it, did 
not see eye to eye about Reconstruction. Congress took the po-
sition that the southern states had forfeited their constitutional 
rights and that it was Congress's prerogative to decide when 
those rights would be restored.72 Johnson's desire for a more le-
writes that "the amendment seems to imply that the concurrent power of the state and 
federal governments over the militia will not threaten the states or obstruct their use of 
the militia when not in federal service. Don Higginbotham, The Federalized Militia De· 
bate: A Neglected Aspect of Second Amendment Scholarship, 55 Wm. & Mary Q. 39, 50 
(1998). . 
69. See Paul Johnson, A History of the American People 494 (Harper Colhns,1998). 
70. See Stephen B. Oates, With Malice Toward None: The Life of Abraham Lincoln 
423 (Harper & Row, 1977) (quoting Lincoln's speech). 
71. Id. 
72. Johnson, A History of the American People at 500 (cited in note 69). 
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nient approach escalated into disputes that ultimately led to his 
impeachment. The legislation prohibiting militia in the former 
Confederate states was part of Congress's program of withhold-
ing the rights of the southern states until Congress believed it 
prudent to restore them. Johnson disagreed with both Con-
gress's policy generally and with this measure specifically. A 
veto was unrealistic, however. The military ban was included in 
legislation providing for the payment of Union soldiers; and 
Johnson, an unelected president from the South, could not af-
ford to be perceived as standing in the way of paying Union sol-
diers. Besides, Congress probably would have overridden the 
veto, as it did with Johnson's vetoes of other Reconstruction leg-
islation that he considers too harsh. 
Much has been written about whether Congress was moti-
vated by hatred and a desire to punish rather than reconstruct 
the South, and about whether the Republican congressional ma-
jority was also influenced by a partisan desire to control the 
South politically. Yet these were unique and difficult times.73 A 
civil war had just ended, and many within the southern states 
remained bitter and hostile to the national government, as well 
as to freedmen. In June 1866, a joint committee of Congress 
charged with investigating conditions in the post-war South re-
ported that the South was "in anarchy" and under the control of 
"unrepentant ... rebels." 74 No court could properly have substi-
tuted its own evaluation for Congress's judgment that that for-
mer Confederate army units were reorganizing as militia units, 
endangering the security of the reemerging states and their citi-
zens. The question is whether, accepting the congressional find-
ings on their face, suspending the states' right to militia was un-
constitutional. 
To answer that question, one must ask whether the govern-
ment may properly exercise extraordinary powers during war or 
other periods of crises. At least twice, the Supreme Court has 
held that it may. During World War I, the Court upheld convic-
73. As Henry P. Monaghan observed, "A bloody Civil War, an event wholly un-
foreseen by the founding generation, may not be a fruitful source for deriving constitu-
tional lessons." Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1, 27 (1993). That is certainly the case here. I ask whether the militia prohibition 
violated the Second Amendment although Congress took the position that all states' 
rights were in a period of suspension. Indeed, Congress ultimately established military 
governments in what it called the "Rebel States." Nevertheless, to use this case history 
as a tool for drawing lessons of general applicability about the Second Amendment, I 
assume that constitutional normalcy was required to the greatest extent possible. 
74. See Johnson, A History of the American People at 502 (cited in note 69). 
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tions for making speeches and circulating flyers questioning the 
government's war policies because they allegedly obstructed 
military recruiting efforts. 75 In the World War II Japanese in-
terment cases,76 the Supreme Court more directly held that dur-
ing war the government's power expands as necessity requires. 
Writing for the Supreme Court in Korematsu, Hugo Black de-
clared that the government's "power to ~rotect must be com-
mensurate with the threatened danger." 7 Concurring, Felix 
Frankfurter declared that "the validity of action under the war 
power must be judged wholly in the context of war," and that an 
action should not "be stigmatized as lawless because like action 
in times of peace would be lawless."78 In Hirabayashi, the Su-
preme Court invoked Charles Evans Hughes' famous phrase 
that the "war power of the national government is 'the power to 
wage successfully."' 79 
The principle that the government's powers expand during 
war or other grave emergencies is, however, extremely contro-
versial. The confinement of Americans of Japanese descent dur-
ing the Second World War has come to be considered a national 
disgrace. In 1988, Congress enacted legislation formally apolo-
gizing for the internment and providing restitution to the indi-
viduals of Japanese ancestry who were interned,80 and the Su-
preme Court's decisions in the Japanese internment cases are 
generally considered among its worst. 81 The government did not 
75. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 
(1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). The Supreme Court purported to 
apply the same test used in peacetime. "The question in every case is whether the words 
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and pre-
sent danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent," Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote for the Court. Schenck at 52. How-
ever, the Court accepted, without meaningful review, the government's allegation that 
the defendants' statements created insubordination in the armed forces or obstructed 
military recruiting or enlistment. "When a nation is at war many things that might be 
said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be en-
dured so long as men fight and that no Court no regard them as protected by any consti-
tutional right" Holmes added. ld. 
76. Korcmatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 
320 u.s. 81 (1943). 
77. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220. 
78. ld. at 224. 
79. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93. 
80. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1989 et seq. 
81. See, e.g., Bernard Schwartz, A Book of Legal Lists: The Best and Worst in 
American Law with 100 Courc and Judge Trivia Questions 76-78 (Oxford U. Press, 1997) 
(placing Korematsu number six among the ten worst Supreme Court decisions of all 
time); J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 Harv. 
L. Rev. 963, 1018 (1998) (listing Korematsu, together with Lochner v. New York and 
Plessy v. Ferguson, as a case "that any theory worth its salt must show [to be] wrongly 
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attempt to suppress civil liberties during the Vietnam War to the 
same degree as it had during earlier engagements;82 and when 
the government asked the Supreme Court to enjoin the New 
York Times from publishing the Pentagon Papers, classified 
documents relating to origins of American involvement in Viet-
nam, the Court refused. 
Perhaps the more liberal experience during the Vietnam 
War was the result of a durable change in attitudes about sup-
pressing civil liberties during wartime, influenced in part by 
shame over the Japanese internment. It is at least as likely, 
however, that the nation could simply afford a more liberal atti-
tude because the Vietnam War never threatened American na-
tionhood. When the nation's existence is in peril, the people will 
expect their leaders to take extraordinary, and if necessary extra-
legal, measures. Even those who reject the principle that the 
government's powers should be deemed to expand during war 
acknowledge these realities. Laurence H. Tribe, for example, 
writes that "[i]n retrospect, the Supreme Court's tolerance of 
wartime excesses of Congress and the Executive seems wrong, 
but in retrospect it is also clear that the Court saw no reasonable 
alternative to deference."83 The Court may believe deference is 
required for the national safety, or it may believe that if the 
Court intervenes it will be perceived as aiding and abetting an 
enemy and destroy its own credibility in the eyes of the public. 84 
Yet there is grave danger in legitimizing the principle that power 
expands during national emergencies. If the courts were to sanc-
tion such a principle, they would give putative autocrats a tool 
for unraveling the Constitution and seizing power. Crises can be 
unscrupulously feigned, manufactured, or sustained. McCarthy-
esque figures can create paranoia without even the threat of 
open warfare. 
decided"); William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Forward: Law as Equilibrium, 
108 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 94 (1994) (listing Korematsu, along with Plessy, as a quintessential 
example of a case in which the Supreme Court yielded to popular prejudice only to look 
foolish or short-sighted). Probably the most noteworthy dissenting view is that of Chief 
Justice William H. Rehnquist, who defends the Court's decisions in the internment cases. 
William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime (Knopf, 1998). 
82. See Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War 
on Drugs, 66 S.Cal. L. Rev. 1389, 1392-95 (1993). 
83. Tribe, American Constitutional Law§ 5-18 at 966 (cited in note 67). 
84. Another view, which is falling into increasing disfavor, is that courts should al-
ways defer to the political branches in all questions involving foreign affairs, generally by 
mvokmg the pohtical questiOn doctnne. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Political Ques-
tions/Judicial Answers: Does the Rule of Law Apply to Foreign Affairs? (Princeton U. 
Press, 1992). 
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Surprisingly little has been written about whether the power 
of the national government as a whole-that is, Congress and 
the president acting together-expands during wartime or peri-
ods of dire emergency. Because the greatest fear is that of an 
overreaching president, judicial opinions and scholarship have 
most frequently focused on presidential power, and specifically 
on whether the President can take military action without con-
gressional approval.85 Indeed, the phrase war power generally 
refers to the scope of the president's power as commander in 
chief of the army and navy-and, as useful to mention for our 
purposes, "of the Militia of the several States, when called into 
the actual Service of the United States"86-to send American 
forces into combat without a congressional declaration of war. 
Often the problem is whether the president may act with 
tacit congressional approval, that is, with Congress not expressly 
authorizing the military action but not taking action to terminate 
it by, for example, cutting off funds. Nearly the reverse situation 
occurred when Congress enacted legislative depriving the south-
ern states of their militia during Reconstruction. President 
Johnson signed the legislation despite his misgivings about its 
constitutionality because the legislation also provided for paying 
Union soldiers. (Johnson may have expected that Congress 
would override his veto, thus earning him the enmity of Union 
soldiers for no ultimate purpose.) Notwithstanding Johnson's 
reluctance, Congress and the President did act together. The 
question before us, therefore, is not whether one of the political 
branches of the government infringed upon powers belonging to 
the other but rather whether the federal government-at the 
maximum extent of its power, based on the combined action of 
Congress and the president and a situation of warlike exigency-
was justified in temporarily abrogating the states' right to have 
militia. 
One might argue that the federal action was justified re-
gardless of whether the government's powers were enlarged by 
crisis. The argument runs as follows. The Second Amendment's 
spirit should trump its letter. The Amendment's purpose is to 
allow the states to provide for their own security, and the 
Amendment therefore should be read as guaranteeing a state a 
85. Sec, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, The Invasion of Panama and the Rule of Law, 26 Int'l 
Law. 781 (1992); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 Yale 
L.J. 1385 ((1989); Charles Bennett, eta!., The President's Powers as Commander-in-Chief 
Versus Congress' War Power and Appropriations Power, 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 17 (1988). 
86. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 2, cl. 1. 
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right to a militia only when a militia is, in fact, necessary for the 
security of the state and its citizens. The preamble of the 
Amendment lends special force to this argument. Because the 
drafters expressly told us why they granted the right, we need 
not worry about our failing to recognize the founders' objectives 
and can feel confident about knowing when the right no longer 
serves its intended purpose.87 Thus, when for any reason the mi-
litia is not necessary for the security of a free state, the right 
should be considered inactive or, as some commentators have 
put it, "in suspension. "88 The nation need not be at war or in cri-
sis. If changed circumstances have eliminated the necessity of 
the militia, the right may be considered suspended even during 
periods of normalcy. 
This argument is problematic however. While it is perfectly 
sensible as a matter of constitutional theory to hold that time can 
turn constitutional provisions into anachronisms, it is ticklish as a 
practical matter to declare a right out of date. It would be one 
thing if everyone agreed that a provision had outlived its useful-
ness (though almost by definition that is unlikely to arise in con-
tested cases). It is quite another thing for a court to abrogate a 
right because it finds we are now better off without it. Such a 
court would be criticized for taking it upon itself to amend the 
Constitution. 89 
A more moderate approach would hold that the Second 
Amendment right may be suspended when state control of a mi-
litia jeopardizes the security of the state or its citizens. Thus, the 
right remains active as long as it serves the interests of security 
or is simply benign. But the right may be suspended when it is 
actively counterproductive. There should be a presumption that 
the right remains active during periods of normalcy. The case 
for suspending the right is strongest during relatively brief peri-
ods of crisis. And the case is strongest as well when Congress, 
which has the constitutional authority to organize the militia, 
87. Justice Scalia has cautioned about the hazards of abstracting a right from its 
purposes and then eliminating that right because it finds the purposes arc served in other 
ways. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). That con-
cern is ameliorated when the Constitution expressly states that a right has been included 
to serve a particular objective. 
88. Uviller and Merkel, 76 Chi. Kent L. Rev. at 560 (cited in note 3). 
89. There may be a fine line between this and effectively amending the Constitution 
by reinterpreting a provision in light of changed times and circumstances. Nevertheless, 
there is a difference between a court modifying its interpretations of a provision and 
snipping out the provision. 
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and the President, who is commander in chief of the militia when 
it is into national service, act together.90 
Congress prohibited militias in the ten former Confederate 
States because it found them to endanger public security. It con-
ducted an investigation. It found the southern states to be in 
anarchy, and it found that the southern militias were being re-
constituted from former Confederate Army units. Although in 
normal circumstances the militia serves as a counterweight to 
anarchy, Congress found that under these unusual and perilous 
circumstances, the militias would endanger the stability of state 
government (whether civilian or military) during the period of 
Reconstruction. 
Moreover, it does not appear that Congress had an alterna-
tive that would have allowed the southern states to have militias 
without creating grave risks. Because states select the officers of 
their militia, Congress may not have been able to ensure that mi-
litias were loyal to the United States. Restricting militia eligibil-
ity to those who had not served in the Confederate Army may 
not have been a practical option, as presumably nearly every 
white fit for military service served in that army.91 Restricting 
the militia to freed blacks would have been even more repugnant 
to the founders' original intent than prohibiting the militia en-
tirely. The specific concern that led to Madison's writing the 
Second Amendment was the fear that Congress would disarm 
the southern militias and thus leave the white population vulner-
able to slave revolt. Although black citizens no longer needed to 
revolt to secure their freedom, the white population, fearing ret-
ribution, would have been terrified of a black militia.92 I con-
90. I leave aside the question of how much deference the Supreme Court ought to 
give the political branches. Briefly, I believe the Supreme Court must take into account 
political and practical exigencies, including the need of the political branches to act rap-
idly and decisively in emergencies. But I concur generally with view that the Court must 
not abdicate its responsibilities to uphold the Constitution, and that, as Thomas M. 
Franck has put it, "in our system a law that is not enforceable by adjudicatory process is 
no law at all." Franck, Political Questions/Judicial Answers at 8 (cited in note 84). 
91. Nearly one million men-90 percent of the able-bodied, adult, white popula-
tion-served in the Confederate Army. See Johnson, A History of the American People 
at 462, 466 (cited in note 69). 
92. I am not suggesting that Madison and the founders' concern about slave control 
should forever shape how we interpret the Second Amendment. They wrote the 
Amendment in general terms, and the Amendment therefore did not expire with the end 
of slavery. It will continue to have viability as long as there are threats to the security of 
states and their citizens from any source. Nor I am suggesting that a black militia was a 
greater threat to white citizens than a white militia was to black citizens. However, the 
formation of black militias probably would have caused the formation of white paramili-
tary organizations (which, of course, eventually occurred with the Ku Klux Klan and 
similar groups), frustrating reconstruction efforts. 
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elude, therefore, that Congress did not violate the Second 
Amendment by prohibiting militias in the ten Confederate 
States during the early Reconstruction period. 
Much of what has been said about the propriety of suspend-
ing a state's right to an armed militia during crisis applies to the 
Little Rock and Tuscaloosa episodes as well. In each instance, 
the President called up the state militia pursuant to a specific 
constitutional warrant, that is, to execute the laws of the United 
States, as decreed by federal courts. In each instance, there was 
a crisis requiring federal military intervention. Although the 
events did not rise to the level of wartime-like emergencies, they 
were serious and presented challenges to the rule of law. Presi-
dent Eisenhower federalized the Arkansas militia- the entire 
state militia-not because he intended to use it as his instrument 
for directly executing the laws (he relied on 10151 Airborne units 
and U.S. marshals for that) but to deprive the state's governor of 
its use. That was legitimate; once the president decided to dis-
patch federal personnel, it was only proper that he try to reduce 
the risks of hostile actions that might threaten federal personnel 
or interfere with their mission. By calling the Arkansas National 
Guard into federal service, President Eisenhower was seeking to 
preserve peace and security in Arkansas, not threatening it. 
Wallace's stand in the schoolhouse door presents other in-
teresting features. As it turned out, the federalization of the 
Alabama National Guard had little military significance but po-
tent political significance. For one thing, the doorway stand was 
purely symbolic. And the federal government probably would 
have had little difficulty protecting Malone and Hood without 
calling up the Guard. Yet somehow federalization of the Guard 
ended the crisis (or perhaps, in this case, faux crisis). The de-
nouement of the episode was General Graham's saluting the 
Governor and informing him that he and the state Guard were 
now in the service of the President of the United States. Surely 
this was not because this dissolved the possibility of U.S. Armed 
Forces and Alabama National Guard going to war with each 
other. That was not remotely within the realm of possibility. 
Was it because nationalizing the Guard somehow tangibly dem-
onstrated the supremacy of federal authority? Was it because 
depriving the Governor of his use of the Guard somehow politi-
cally emasculated him? The national government's ability to 
federalize-or the state's ability to retain-the militia are politi-
cal as well as military assets. In considering whether the national 
government can properly deprive a state of its militia in some fu-
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ture scenario, it may be relevant to consider the psychological 
and political ramifications as well as purely military issues. 
What if in a time of crisis a benevolent governor needed her 
state's militia to preserve peace and order and a malevolent 
president, desiring uncontrolled riotin~, federalized the militia 
and confined them to their armories?9 In that case, we might 
regret precedents approving the federalization of state militias to 
deprive governors of their use. The courts provide the only insti-
tutional check on this kind of misuse of power, although a far 
from perfect check it must necessarily be. Courts must generally 
defer to the judgment of the political branches in time of crisis; 
often the best they can do is to condemn actions after the fact. 94 
Issues involving the Second Amendment and the militia are not 
unique in this respect. During an emergency, however, the 
president must have the ability to call the militia into federal 
service, against the governor's wishes if need be. Since the Civil 
War, it is clearly unacceptable for state forces to clash militarily 
with federal forces. We should not, therefore, read the Second 
Amendment as an impediment avoiding such conflicts by the 
president's exercise of his constitutional authority as com-
mander-in-chief. 
The battle between the governors and the Reagan Admini-
stration over sending National Guard units to Central America, 
and the subsequent enactment of the Montgomery Amendment, 
raise other issues. As a practical matter, the federal government 
can deprive a state of its armed militia by sending it away. The 
anti-Federalists raised this specific concern when they argued 
that the Constitution gave the federal government too much 
power over the state militia.95 Federal statutes now give the 
President and the Secretary of State considerable powers to call 
the militia into federal service. The Secretary may call up the 
militia during a war or national emergency declared by Con-
gress, and the militia forces may remain in federal service for the 
duration of the war or emergency plus six months.96 The Secre-
tary may call up the militia during a national emergency declared 
93. As Garry Wills observes, however, history has shown that abuse of individual 
rights and peccancy tend to thrive more at the local level, and the federal government has 
often been the rescuer of the weak abused by the powerful. See Garry Wills, A Neces-
sary Evil: A History of Distrust of Government 110 (Simon & Schuster, 1999). 
94. By invoking the political question doctrine, as first articulated in Luther v. Bor-
den, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), courts may escape condemning improper action after the 
fact as well. 
95. See Bogus, 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 344-54 (cited in note 12). 
96. 10 U.S.C. § 12301(a) (1994). 
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by the President, but in this case the militia forces may be re-
tained in federal service for no more than twenty-four consecu-
tive months.97 Finally, and most broadly, the Secretary of De-
fense may call up the militia whenever "the President 
determines that it is necessary to augment the active forces for 
any operational mission[.] "98 
The militia may be called into federal service "to execute 
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Inva-
sions. "99 Once called into federal service for such a purpose, the 
President, as commander-in-chief, can send militia forces where 
she sees fit. If, for example, hostile forces were to invade Seat-
tle, the President could send the entire Massachusetts National 
Guard to Washington State to repel the invasion, even if this 
were to reduce internal security within Massachusetts. The secu-
rity of the nation transcends that of individual states. And al-
though the language of the Constitution seems to contemplate 
the militia being used only domestically to "suppress Insurrec-
tions and repel Invasions," a reasonable interpretation of the 
President's war power would allow him to send militia forces 
into British Columbia if that were required for effective military 
operations. Nor, at least under Supreme Court precedents, 
would it be problematic for the President to send part of the 
Massachusetts National Guard to some distant locale for training 
purposes. 100 
However, if the Second Amendment is properly read as 
guaranteeing states some minimum right to an armed militia, the 
President, even with Congress's consent, would not be author-
ized in sending the entire Massachusetts Guard to some distant 
locale for training or some other non-emergency purpose, espe-
cially if this left Massachusetts vulnerable to an internal threat. 
This does not mean that Congress cannot organize the militia as 
it has, in making every member of the Massachusetts National 
Guard is also a member of the reserve forces of the United 
States. But Congress should not be able to use this method of 
organization to deprive a state of its right to an armed militia. 
That is, each member of the Massachusetts National Guard may 
be ordered-in his or her capacity as a member of the reserve 
97. Id. § 12302(a) (1994). 
98. Id. § 12304(a) (1994). 
99. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 8, d. 15. 
100. A student commentator has persuasively argued that the Constitution exclu-
sively reserves to the states the authority to train the militia. See Monte M.F. Cooper, 
Perp1ch v. Department of Defense: Federalism Values and the Militia Clause, 62 U. Colo. 
L. Rev. 637 (1991). 
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forces of the United States-to training exercises in Washington 
State; the problem arises when every member of the Massachu-
setts Guard is so dispatched. That is not what occurred in the 
events giving rise to Perpich however. In this scenario, too, 
therefore, the states' Second Amendment rights were not vio-
lated. 
I have argued that, except in extreme circumstances, the 
Second Amendment provides the states with some minimum 
right to an armed militia. What are the parameters of that right? 
How large a militia-in absolute numbers or in proportion to 
population-is a state entitled to? What types and numbers of 
arms does a state militia have a right to possess? Those ques-
tions cannot be answered in the abstract. The Second Amend-
ment sets forth a principle, not a formula. The parameters of the 
right can only sensibly be mapped on a case by case basis. 
Perhaps the need to do so will never arise. At this writing, 
no such clash between federal and state governments appears on 
the horizon. But we do not have a crystal ball. When the Con-
stitution was written, the southern states genuinely feared the 
prospect of the federal government deliberately attempting to 
deny them armed militias. 101 It is perhaps no coincidence that 
concerns about the federal government undermining the slave 
system led to the Second Amendment, and that the first three of 
these case histories are part of slavery's legacy. Issues creating 
distrust and dissension between the federal and state govern-
ments may be very different in the future. No one can foresee 
what those issues may be. Under a collective rights interpreta-
tion, however, the Second Amendment remains a vital constitu-
tional provision. It is a discrete but important element of feder-
alism, guaranteeing the states not only a right but the capacity to 
provide for their own security. 
101. It bears mentioning that when the Second Amendment was enacted, the militia 
constituted the state's exclusive instrument of armed force. Police forces did not exist 
until the early nineteenth century. See Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots and Guns, 66 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 1365, 1378-80 (1993). Today, of course, police help protect a state from riots or 
other internal disruptions. Thus, when considering whether a state's security may be 
jeopardized by depriving it of its militia, it is appropriate to consider that the availability 
of police. 
